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Article 9

The Effect of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
on the Standards of Review for Final Administrative
Agency Adjudications*
I.

INTRODUCI'ION

Perhaps the most difficult problem in administrative law is determining the amount of deference that courts should accord final administrative
agency decisions. The problem is complex and requires a proper
allocation of expertise between courts and agencies. 1 As one commentator has explained:
If courts were to police agencies by assessing every administrative
decision from scratch (de novo), any efficiency or other gains that [the
legislature] seeks by vesting authority in expert administrators would be
all but lost. Moreover, such a role would threaten to usurp policy
authority from both [the legislature] and the executive. On the other
hand, simply granting agency decisions deference would render the
judicial role superfluous. Thus, determining the appropriate intensity
of judicial oversight is of paramount importance in adjusting the courts'
relationship to the other institutions of government. 2

Utah courts have struggled with this problem of determining the
appropriate standards of review for final agency adjudications. Before
1988, Utah courts reviewed final agency actions based on whether the
question was one of fact, law, or mixed law and fact. Agency findings
of fact were granted considerable deference and disturbed on appeal only
if unsupported by "evidence of any substance whatever. " 3 In contrast,
agency determinations of general law were reviewed using a correctionof-error standard which accorded no deference to agency decisions.
Finally, mixed questions of law and fact were reviewed using an
intermediate deference standard. Under this standard, agency decisions
were upheld so long as they were within the bounds of reasonableness.

*

Copyright <U> 1995 by John C. Steele.
I. Tim J. Filer, The Scope ofJudicial Review ofAgency Actions in Washington Revisited-Doctrine, Analysis and Proposed Revisions, 60 WASH. L. REv. 653 (1985).
2. JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PuBUC LAW
SYSTEM CASES AND MATERIALS 706-07 (3d ed. 1992).
3. Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 609 (Utah
1983).
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In January of 1988, the legislature passed the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act (UAPA). 4 UAPA governs all state agency action and
review of such action. 5 Although UAPA details under what circumstances a party may seek appellate relief from an agency decision, it does not
specify the standard of review courts should apply. 6 As a result, postUAPA courts have been forced to make their own determinations as to
what standards of review to apply to the various types of challenges that
may be made.
This comment will examine both how Utah courts have articulated
the standards of review under UAPA and the amount of deference Utah
courts accord formal agency adjudications. Part II of this paper sets forth
the standards of review used by the courts before UAPA was enacted.
Part III sets forth the standards of review, as determined by the Utah
Supreme Court, under UAPA, and explains how they differ from the
pre-UAPA standards. Finally, Part IV evaluates the effect UAPA has
had on the deference a court will accord agency decisions in adjudicative
proceedings.
II.

PRE-UAPA STANDARDS

OF REVIEW

Before the enactment of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, the
Utah Supreme Court had developed clear standards for reviewing final
administrative agency actions. In Utah Department of Administrative
Services v. Public Service Commission, 7 Justice Oaks, writing for a
unanimous court, set forth three standards of review and made it clear
that the degree of deference a court will accord an agency's decision
depends upon whether the agency determination is a finding of fact, law,
or mixed law and fact. Agency findings of basic fact were to be granted
considerable deference and would only be overturned on appeal if they
were not supported by "evidence of any substance whatever. " 8
In contrast, agency determinations of general law were to be
reviewed using a correction-of-error standard, giving no deference to the
agency's decision. 9 According to Justice Oaks, general questions of law
included rulings concerning constitutional questions, rulings concerning
the agency's jurisdiction or statutory authority, rulings concerning

4. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 63-46b-22( 1)( 1994) provides that "[t]he procedures for agency
action, agency review, and judicial review contained in this chapter are applicable to all agency
adjudicative proceedings commenced by or before an agency on or after January 1, 1988."
5. Id. § 63-46b-l.
6. ld. § 63-46b-16(4).
7. 658 P.2d 601.
8. ld. at 609.
9. ld. at 608.
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common law principles such as the interpretation of contracts and
certificates, and rulings concerning the interpretation of statutes unrelated
to the agency. 10 The court refused to grant agency determinations of
general law any deference because the court was comparatively more
qualified than the agency to rule on such issues. 11
Finally, for issues characterized as "special law," 12 "mixed
questions of law and fact," or the "application of the findings of basic
facts . . . to the legal rules governing the case, " 13 an intermediate
standard of review, which grants some deference to an agency's decision,
was applied. Under the intermediate standard, agency decisions were to
be upheld so long as they fell within the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality. 14 According to Justice Oaks, an intermediate standard of
review was necessary because:
['I]he terms law and fact and the extent of judicial review associated
with them have not provided the analytical framework to explain the
various types of review actually exercised by the courts. . . . [P]ractical
experience with judicial review has unquestionably identified a major
category of administrative decisions on which reviewing courts exercise
a scope of review more extensive than when reviewing agency findings
on questions of basic fact, but less extensive than when reviewing to
correct error in agency decisions on questions of generallaw. 15

Subsequent to Administmtive Services, a large body of case law
evolved applying and refining the scope of the three standards. 16 While

10. /d.
11. /d.
12. Questions of "special law" or "agency specific law" deal with an agency's "interpretations of the operative provisions of the statutory law it is empowered to administer, especially
those generalized terms that bespeak a legislative intent to delegate their interpretation to the
responsible agency." /d. at 610.
13. /d.
14. /d. at 609-10.
15. /d. at 610 (citations omitted).
16. See, e.g., Telecommunications Resellers v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 747 P.2d 1029,
1030 (Utah 1987); Taylor v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 743 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Utah 1987);
True-Flo Mechanical Sys. v. Board of Review, 743 P.2d 1161, 1163 (Utah 1987); Spreader
Specialists, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 738 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 1987); Smith v. Board
of Review, 714 P.2d 1154, 1155 (Utah 1986); Big K Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 689 P.2d
1349, 1353 (Utah 1984); Barney v. Department of Employment Sec., 681 P.2d 1273, 1275
(Utah 1984); Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d 1135, 1139 (Utah
1983); Harry L. Young & Sons v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 672 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1983).
The court of appeals also decided several cases applying the three standards of review articulated in Administrative Services. See, e.g., USX Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 781 P.2d 883,
886 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Olympus Oil v. Harrison, 778 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); Capital Gen. Corp. v. Utah Dep'tofBusiness Regulation, 777 P.2d 494,496 (Utah Ct.
App.), cert denied, 781 P.2d 878 (Utah 1989); Kline v. Utah Dep't of Health, 776 P.2d 57,
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review of agency determinations of fact remained consistent, 17 it was not
always clear when courts should apply the intermediate standard of
review. For example, in Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisby/ 8 the Utah
Supreme Court used the intermediate standard to review the Industrial
Commission's interpretation of the term "employee" in Utah's workers'
compensation statute. The court affirmed the Industrial Commission's
decision that a subcontractor injured while installing metal siding was an
"employee" of Pinter Construction Company entitled to workmen's
compensation. The court deferred to the Commission's decision stating
that "as to questions of mixed law and fact, the Court will not substitute
its judgment for that of the agency as long as the commission's interpretation has warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in the law. " 19
Notwithstanding the decision in Pinter, the court used a correctionof-error standard to review the Industrial Commission's interpretation of
the term "employee" in Bennett v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 20 In
Bennett, the court considered whether the Commission had erred in
deciding that Bennett was not entitled to workers' compensation because
he was an independent contractor and not an "employee" under Utah's
workers' compensation statute. This time the court refused to defer to
the Commission's decision, stating that "[w]hether a worker is an
employee within the meaning of the workers' compensation laws requires
the application of a statutory standard to the facts. Since resolution of the
issue is not benefitted by Commission expertise or experience, we do not
defer to the Commission's ruling. " 21
Subsequent Utah Supreme Court cases have attempted to clarify
which agency decisions should be reviewed under the intermediate
standard, and which should be reviewed under the correction-of-error
standard. In Hurley v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 22 the
supreme court considered whether the Board of Review erred in holding
that the 52-week period for applying for benefits under the Trade Act was
to be computed from the worker's first lay-off rather than his second

60 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Taylor v. Utah State Training Sch., 775 P.2d 432, 432-34 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989); Boyd v. Department of Employment Sec., 773 P.2d 398, 400 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); Smith & Edwards Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 770 P.2d 1016, 1017 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); Sisco Hilte v. Industrial Comm'n, 766 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
17. See, e.g., Hurley v. Board of Review, 767 P.2d 524, 526 (Utah 1988); Bennett v.
Industrial Comm'n, 726 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986); Big K Corp., 689 P.2d at 1353.
18. 678 P.2d 305, 307 (Utah 1984).
19. !d. (citing Salt Lake City Corp. v. Department of Employment Sec., 657 P.2d 1312,
1316 (Utah 1982)).
20. 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986).
21. !d. at 429 (citations omitted).
22. 767 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988).
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lay-off. The Board argued that the court should accord its decision
deference and apply the intermediate standard of review because the issue
was one of mixed fact and law. 23 Petitioners, on the other hand, argued
that the question of whether the 52-week period should run from their
first or second termination was solely a matter of statutory interpretation,
and therefore no deference should be accorded the Board's decision. 24
In distinguishing the two standards, the court noted that agency
decisions which are granted a deferential review are often mixed
questions of law and fact which require application of specific technical
fact situations to the statutes that an agency is empowered to administer.
These are the types of decisions and applications in which the agency's
special expertise puts it in a better position than an appellate court to
evaluate the circumstances of the case in light of the agency mission. 25
By contrast, decisions concerning statutory interpretations, issues of basic
legislative intent, or construction of ordinary terms in the statute of an
agency, involve areas in which an appellate court is as well suited to
decide the legal questions as is the agency. In such circumstances, the
court should apply the correction-of-error standard and accord no
deference to the agency's decision. 26
The court has since reaffirmed its conclusion that under pre-UAPA
law the intermediate standard of review should only be applied in areas
of agency technical expertise. The court stated:
[l)t is not the characterization of an issue as a mixed question of fact
and law or the characterization of the issue as a question of general law
that is dispositive of the determination of the appropriate level of
judicial review. Rather, what has developed as the dispositive factor is
whether the agency, by virtue of its experience or expertise, is in a
better position than the courts to give effect to the regulatory objective
to be achieved. v

23. ld. at 527.
24. ld.
25. ld. at 526.
26. ld. at 528.
27. Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah
1991). See Chris and Dick's Lumber & Hardware v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511 (Utah
1988), wherein the Utah Supreme Court stated:
In the usual case, questions of statutory construction are matters of law for the courts,
and we rely on a 'correction of error' standard of review, according no deference to
[the] administrative agency's interpretation. There are a limited number of
circumstances where the agency's interpretation of a statute or rule may be entitled
to some deference, as where construction of the statute should take into account the
agency's expertise developed from its practical, firsthand experience with the subject
matter.
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Table I on the following page summarizes the pre-UAPA standards
of review.
Ill.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW UNDER UAPA

In January of 1988, the Utah Legislature passed the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, which governs all state agency action and review of
such action. 28 Section 63-46b-16 of UAPA prescribes the circumstances
under which a reviewing court may grant relief to a party challenging
final agency action based on a formal adjudication. Subsection (4) of this
section provides that relief shall be granted only if the reviewing court
determines that the aggrieved party has been "substantially prejudiced"
by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any
statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making
process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;

ld. at 513-14 (citations omitted). See also Taylor v. Utah State Training Sch., 775 P.2d 432
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), wherein the Utah Court of Appeals stated:
The more likely it is that agency expertise will assist in resolving an issue, the more
deference courts should give to the agency's resolution. The less pertinent agency
insight is-or the more likely it is that judicial expertise will be most helpful-the less
deference need be paid by reviewing courts to the agency's disposition.
ld. at 434.
28. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-1(1) (1994) states that "except as otherwise provided
by a statute superseding provisions of this chapter by explicit reference to this chapter, the
provisions of this chapter apply to every agency of the state and govern ... all state agency
actions ... [and] judicial review of these actions." It is thus possible for a statute to contain
standards of review that preempt the standards applied under UAPA.
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TABLE I: PRE-UAPA STANDARDS OF REVIEW

STANDARD OF
REVIEW

DEGREE OF
DEFERENCE

FINDINGS
OF FACT

Evidence of any
substance
whatever

Great deference

ISSUES OF
GENERAL
LAW

Correction of
error

No deference

Reasonableness
and rationality
(Intermediate
standard
of review)
This standard is
applied only where
the court finds that
the agency, by
virtue of its experience or expertise,
is in a better position than the court
to determine the
issue.

Some deference

I

I

ISSUES OF
AGENCYSPECIFIC
LAW
(Also characterized as
questions of "mixed
law and fact" and
"questions of application of law to fact.")
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(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 29

Implementing UAPA has proven difficult because section 63-46b16(4) deals with judicial relief and not judicial review. 30 Section
63-46b-16(4) gives little guidance concerning the standard of review the
court should apply in determining whether any of the listed errors has
occurred. As Justice Durham has noted:
Section 63-46b-16(4) of UAPA upset [the] previously settled standards
[of review] without indicating what standards should replace them.
While some of the subsections of 63-46b-16(4) incorporate specific
standards of review, most do not. Therefore, since UAPA's adoption,
we have had to make our own determinations of what standards of
review to apply to various types of challenges to formal agency
adjudications. 31

Although the court has not yet developed a comprehensive guide to
the proper standard of review applicable to each provision of section 6346b-16(4), it has considered many of the provisions in individual cases.
A review of these cases reveals that UAPA has altered the pre-UAPA
framework in several significant respects.
A.

Requirement of Substantial Prejudice

Perhaps the first noticeable difference between UAPA and pre-UAPA
case law is the added requirement in section 63-46b-16(4) that an
appellate court find that a party seeking review has been "substantially
prejudiced" by an agency's actions before it will grant relief. In Savage
Industries v. Utah State Tax Commission, 32 the Tax Commission argued
that the phrase "substantially prejudiced" implied that the court should
grant deference to agency decisions and uphold them unless they were
"substantially" incorrect. 33 The court disagreed, explaining that:
The phrase "substantial prejudice" within subsection (4) refers to the
"person seeking review." It does not modify the actual standards of
review found within subsection (4). This means that the person seeking

29. ld. § 63-46b-16(4).
30. Morton, 814 P.2d at 584.
31. Semeco Indus. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1170
(Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
32. 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991).
33. ld. at 669.
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review of an agency action must suffer substantial prejudice as a result
of that action before a court may grant relief from the action. This portion of subsection (4) relates to the damage or harm suffered by the
person seeking review and was written to ensure that a court will not
issue advisory opinions reviewing agency action when no true controversy has resulted from that action. The phrase simply does not relate
to the degree of deference a court must give an agency decision. 34

Although the court has not yet developed a comprehensive guide to
the proper standard of review applicable to each provision of section
63-46b-16(4), it has considered many of the provisions in individual
cases.

1.

Subsection (4)(a): Unconstitutional Agency Action

Subsection (4)(a) allows an appellate court to grant relief where "the
agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based,
is unconstitutional on its face or as applied. " 35
The Utah Supreme
Court reviewed a challenge brought under subsection (4)(a) in Questar
Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission. 36 In that case, the court
was asked to determine whether the Thx Commission violated the U.S.
Constitution's Commerce Clause by applying a sales and use tax to gas
diverted by Questar from its pipelines into compressors, which provided
the pressure necessary to move the gas towards its destination. In regard
to the standard of review, the court first noted that "[a]lthough some of
the subsections of section 63-46b-16(4) incorporate specific standards of
review, taken individually, subsection 63-46b-16(4)(a) is not helpful in
that regard. " 37 The court then concluded that it would not grant the
Commission's decision any deference because constitutional challenges
under subsection (4)(a) are questions of general law which are to be
reviewed under a correction-of-error standard, giving no deference to the
agency's decision. 38 This is the same standard of review the courts
applied to constitutional questions before UAPA was enacted.

34. /d. See also Monon, 814 P.2d at 584, wherein the Utah Supreme Court held that
the substantial prejudice requirement "does not affect the degree of deference an appellate court
grants to an agency's decision. Rather, [the phrase] ensures that relief should not be granted
when, although the agency committed error, the error was harmless." The court added that
"an error will be harmless if it is 'sufficiently inconsequential that ... there is no reasonable
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings."' (quoting State v. Verde,
770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)).
35. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(4)(a) (1994).
36. 817 P.2d 316 (Utah 1991).
37. !d. at 317 (citations omitted).
38. !d. at 318 (citing Savage Indus. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670
(Utah 1991)).
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2.

Subsection (4)(b): Agency Action Beyond Jurisdiction Conferred
by Statute

Agency action challenged under subsection (4)(b), which permits
relief if the agency has acted "beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any
statute, " 39 is also reviewed using the correction-of-error standard. To
date, the court has applied subsection (4)(b) in only one circumstance.
In Bennion v. ANR Production Co. ,40 the court considered whether the
State Board of Oil, Gas & Mining had authority to modify a pooling
order. The court held that the issue was a question of law and thus its
review was governed by the correction-of-error standard. 41 Although
the court affirmed that the Board had the power to modify a pooling
order, it did not grant the Board's decision any deference.
3.

Subsections (4)(c), (4)(e) and (4)(f): Legal Error Provisions

The Utah Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to consider
challenges to agency action under subsections (4)(c), (4)(e)42 and 4(f).
Like subsections (4)(a) and (4)(b), these provisions do not incorporate
any specific standards of review. By their terms, however, all three
provisions concern legal error: subsection (4)(c) allows relief when an
agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 43 subsection (4)(e) permits relief for "unlawful" agency procedure; 44 and
subsection (4)(f) permits relief for an "illegally constituted" decisionmaking body. 45 As a result, Justice Durham has suggested in a
dissenting opinion that these subsections also involve issues of general
law which should be reviewed using the nondeferential, correction-oferror standard. 46

39. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(4)(b) (1994).
40. 819 P.2d 343, 349 (Utah 1991).
41. !d.
42. Although the Utah Supreme Court has not yet reviewed a challenge to agency action
brought under subsection (4)(e), the Utah Court of Appeals has. In Krantz v. Utah Dep't of
Commerce, 856 P.2d 369 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the court, citing to Justice Durham's review
of UAPA standards in Semeco, held that it would review questions under subsection (4)(e) for
correction of error, granting no deference to the agency's conclusion of the appropriate
procedure. !d. at 370.
43. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(4)(c) (1994).
44. !d. § 63-46b-16(4)(e).
45. ld. § 63-46b-16(4)(f).
46. Semeco Indus. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1172
(Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting).
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Subsection (4)(g): Findings of Fact

The standard an appellate court should apply when reviewing an
agency's factual findings under UAPA is clearly stated. Unlike most of
the other subsections in section 63-46b-16(4), subsection (4)(g) incorporates a specific standard of review which allows an appellate court to alter
an agency's factual findings only if they are "not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court. " 47
In First National Bank of Boston v. Salt Lake County Board of
Equalization, 48 the Utah Supreme Court applied subsection (4)(g) in
reviewing whether the Tax Commission erred in calculating the fair
market value of property owned by First National. In regards to the
"substantial evidence" standard of review incorporated in subsection
(4)(g), the court stated:
Section 63-46b-16(4)(g) requires an appellate court to review the "whole
record" to determine whether the agency's action is "supported by
substantial evidence." "Substantial evidence" is that quantum and
quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable
mind to support a conclusion. An appellate court applying the
"substantial evidence test" must consider both the evidence that supports
the [agency's] factual findings and the evidence that detracts from the
findings. Nevertheless, the party challenging the findings . . . must
marshall all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that
despite the supporting facts, the [agency's] findings are not supported
by substantial evidence. 49

It is clear from the court's description of the "substantial evidence"
test that UAPA has altered the standard of review for an agency's factual
findings. Under pre-UAPA law, an agency's findings of fact were
accorded great deference and upheld so long as they were supported by
"evidence of any substance whatever. " 50 The court's review under the
"evidence of any substance whatever" test was limited to considering
whether there was any competent evidence in the record supporting the
agency's determination. The court in Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of
Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah 51 explained, "In essence,
courts reviewed only that portion of the record which supported the

47. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1994).
48. 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990).
49. !d. at 1165 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
50. Utah Dep't of Administrative Services v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 609
(Utah 1983).
51. 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
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agency's findings. " 52 The "substantial evidence" test in subsection
(4)(g) "grants appellate courts greater latitude in reviewing the record
than was previously granted" under pre-UAPA law. 53 Under subsection
(4)(g), the court will now review both sides of the record to determine
whether the agency's findings are supported by "substantial evidence."
This review is not as strict as a de novo review of the proceedings nor as
lenient as a review for "evidence of any substance whatever." It simply
accords deference to the agency where two reasonable, yet conflicting
conclusions could have been reached. 54 Subsection (4)(g) thus substitutes an intermediate deference standard for a great deference standard.
Reviewing courts will uphold an agency's findings of fact if they are
reasonable and rational. 55
5. Subsection (4){d): Erroneous Interpretations or Applications of
Law

Under subsection (4)(d), an appellate court may grant relief if an
agency has "erroneously interpreted or applied the law. " 56 In Savage
Industries v. Utah State 1llx Commission, 51 the Utah Supreme Court
decided that under subsection (4)(d), just as under pre-UAPA law, a
correction-of-error standard applies to appellate review of agency
interpretations of general law. The issue in Savage was whether
corporations acquired by Savage Industries were entitled to carry over
their own preacquisition losses in determining their annual income for

52. ld. at 68 n.7.
53. ld.
54. Jd. at 68, wherein the Utah Court of Appeals stated:
In undertaking such a review [for substantial evidence], this court will not substitute
its judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though we may have
come to a different conclusion had the case come before us for de novo review. It
is the province of the Board, not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and
where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the
Board to draw the inferences.
ld. (citations omitted).
55. Justice Durham stated:
"[The] substantial evidence test [incorporated in subsection (4)(g) of UAPA] now
appears analogous to the federal substantial evidence test, which requires the
reviewing court to determine if the findings of fact were reasonable and rational. The
substantial evidence test does not permit the reviewing court to conduct its own
weighing of the evidence, but requires it to determine only whether the fact finder's
weighing was reasonable, that is, supported by substantial evidence based on the
record as a whole."
Semeco Indus. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1173 (Utah 1993)
(Durham, J., dissenting).
56. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1994).
57. 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991).
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preparation of Savage Industries' consolidated tax returns. The Tax
Commission, relying on its interpretation of title 59, section 7-108(14)(t)
of the Utah Code, 58 held that the acquired corporations were not allowed
to carry over their preacquisition losses. Savage Industries challenged the
Tax Commission's decision on the ground that it was an erroneous
interpretation of law.
In discussing the appropriate standard of review, the court first noted
that because the Commission's decision was based entirely on its
interpretation of section 59-7-108, it was a question of general law. 59
The court then held that subsection (4)(d) "incorporates the correction-oferror standard previously applied by the Utah courts in cases involving
agency interpretations of [general] law. " 60
The court's decision to apply the correction-of-error standard was
based on the word "erroneous" contained in subsection (4)(d), and
UAPA's legislative history. UAPA was patterned after the Model State
Administrative Procedure Act. 61 The commentators to the Model Act
stated that, "[w]ith regard to the agency's interpretation to [sic] the law,
courts generally give little deference to the agency, with the result that a
court may decide that the agency has erroneously interpreted the law if
the court merely disagrees with the agency's interpretation. " 62
Although Savage confirmed that under subsection (4)(d) a correctionof-error standard applies to agency interpretations of general law, it left
unanswered whether questions of interpreting agency specific law and
questions of applying law to fact should also receive correction-of-error
review. Under pre-UAPA law, an appellate court would have reviewed
these issues using the intermediate standard of review if the agency had
experience or expertise in resolving the specific issue. But, "by using the
word 'erroneously' and incorporating under one provision issues of
application of law, interpretation of general law, and interpretations of
[agency] specific law, subsection (4)(d) . . . upset the pre-UAPA

58. UTAH CoDE ANN.§ 59-7-108(14)(f) (1994) states that, "[c]orporationsacquiringthe
assets or stock of another corporation may not deduct any net loss of the acquired corporation
incurred prior to the date of acquisition."
59. Savage, 811 P.2d. at 666.
60. /d. at 669.
61. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) is nearly identical to Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 5-116(c). The court reasoned that "helpful information about the intended
scope and application of Utah's Act can be obtained by resort [sic] to the comments and cases
concerning the Model Act and its application in other states." Savage, 811 P.2d at 670.
62. Savage, 811 P.2d at 670 (quoting Model State Admin. Procedure Act§ 5-116 cmt.,
15 U .L.A. 127-30 (1981)).
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framework for distinguishing issues suited for intermediate review from
issues suited for no-deference review. " 63
The supreme court comprehensively analyzed subsection (4)(d) in
Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of Utah State 1hx
Commission. 64 In Morton, the Petitioner sought review of the Tax
Commission's determination that certain expenditures made in the
construction of facilities used to produce sodium azide pellets and igniter
materials were not exempt from sales and use tax. Morton's claim to
relief was based on the allegation that the Commission erred in its
interpretation of the Utah Tax Code. Under prior case law, a correctionof-error standard would have been used to review the Commission's
interpretation of the Code unless the Commission, by virtue of its
expertise or experience, was in a better position than the court to decide
the issue.
The court in Morton, however, held that under UAPA it was no
longer appropriate to grant an agency deference solely on the basis of the
agency's experience or expertise. The court stated:
[N]othing in the language of section 63-46b-16 or its legislative history
suggests that an agency's decision is entitled to deference solely on the
basis of agency expertise or experience. Indeed, there is no reference
to agency expertise or experience in the statute or the statute's
legislative history. Rather, in granting judicial relief when an "agency
has erroneously interpreted or applied the law," the language of section
63-46b-16(4) clearly indicates that absent a grant of discretion, a
correction-of-error standard is used in reviewing an agency's interpretation or application of a statutory term. 65

Morton thus established that, under subsection (4)(d), a reviewing
court should not grant intermediate deference to an agency's interpretation or application of law simply because the agency, due to its
experience or expertise, is in a better position than the court to decide the
issue. Rather, an agency's interpretation or application of law should
only be granted deference where the agency has been granted discretion

63. Semeco Indus. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1172
(Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting).
64. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). The issue of whether UAPA altered the standard of
review to be applied to agency specific law was first considered by the Utah Court of Appeals
in Pro Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In that
case, the court determined that review of agency specific law is governed by UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 63-46b-16(4)(d). The court concluded that the intermediate standard of review was the
appropriate standard. The court held that it would "not disturb the Board's application of its
factual findings to the law unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality." Pro Benefit Staffing, 175 P.2d at 442.
65. 814 P.2d at 588.
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"either expressly made in the statute or implied from the statutory language. " 66 If the court finds such a grant of discretion, it should review
the agency's decision under subsection 4(h)(i) for "abuse of discretion"
using the intermediate standard of review.

6.

Subsection (4)(h)
a. Subsection (4)(h)(i): Action is Abuse of Discretion. Subsection
(4)(h) contains four parts. Part (i) permits an appellate court to grant
relief from agency action that is "an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute. " 67 The "abuse of discretion" standard pre-dates
UAPA, and is a type of intermediate review. 68 An appellate court will
uphold an agency's exercise of discretion so long as it is reasonable and
rational. As the court explained in Morton, this intermediate standard of
review is only used where an agency's interpretation or application of law
is an exercise of the agency's statutorily delegated discretion. 69
According to Morton, a statutory delegation of discretion may be either
explicit or implicit. 70 Unfortunately, the court in Morton did not explain
what the phrase "explicit grant of discretion" means. 71 The court did,
however, provide an example of such discretion. The example of an
explicit grant of discretion in Morton related to the Tax Commission
deciding whether a piece of equipment qualified for an exemption from
the sales and use tax. The court cited title 59, section 12-104(16) of the
Utah Code, which provides for a tax exemption on "sales or leases of
machinery and equipment purchased or leased by a manufacturer for use
in new or expanding operations (excluding normal operating replacements
... as determined by the commission). " 12 According to the court, the
phrase "as determined by the commission" represents an explicit grant of
discretion authorizing the Tax Commission to determine whether or not
a piece of equipment qualifies for exemption status. 73 The Commis-

66. ld. at 589. The Morton court suggested that this conclusion may not significantly
affect review of agencies' interpretation and applications of their own statutes because often
where a court would summarily grant an agency deference because of its expertise, it is also
appropriate to grant the agency deference on the basis of an explicit or implicit grant of
discretion contained in the governing statute. ld. at 588-89.
67. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) (1994).
68. Morton, 814 P.2d at 587. See also Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 611-12 (Utah 1983); Salt Lake City Corp. v. Department of
Employment Sec., 657 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Utah 1982); West Jordan v. Department of
Employment Sec., 656 P.2d 411, 414 (Utah 1982).
69. 814 P.2d at 588-89.
70. ld. at 589.
71. King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1287 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
72. Morton, 814 P.2d at 588 n.40 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-12-104(16) (1989)).
73. ld. at 588.
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sian's decision under section 59-12-104(16) would be granted some
deference and reviewed for reasonableness.
Morton also suggested what may constitute an implicit grant of
discretion. In an important passage, the court stated:
[W]hen a legislative intent concerning the specific question at issue can
be derived through traditional methods of statutory construction, the
agency's interpretation will be granted no deference and the statute will
be interpreted in accord with its legislative intent. However, in the
absence of a discernible legislative intent concerning the specific
question in issue, a choice among permissible interpretations of a statute
is largely a policy determination. The agency that has been granted
authority to administer the statute is the appropriate body to make such
a determination. Indeed, both the legislative history to section 63-46b-16
and our prior cases suggest that an appellate court should not substitute
its judgment for the agency's judgment concerning the wisdom of the
agency's policy.
When there is no discernible legislative intent
concerning a specific issue the legislature has, in effect, left the issue
unresolved. In such a case, it is appropriate to conclude that the
legislature has delegated authority to the agency to decide the issue. 74

As an example of this approach, the court cited the case of Salt Lake
Oty Corp. v. Conjer. 75 In that case the court held that the agency's
interpretation of statutory provisions was entitled to deference because
there was "more than one permissible reading of the statute and no basis
in the statutory language ... to prefer one interpretation over another. »76
The methods for finding explicit and implicit grants of discretion
suggested by the court in Morton are not exhaustive. 77 However, in
spite of the approach a court uses, an agency's interpretation or
application of statutory language should only be given deference if the
court finds that the legislature granted the agency discretion concerning
the language in question. 78
The Utah Court of Appeals has had a difficult time applying the
precedent set forth by the supreme court in Morton. 79 The difficulty has

74. Jd. at 589 (footnotes omitted).
75. 674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983).
76. Morton, 814 P.2d at588 (citing Salt Lake City Corp v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632 (Utah
1983)).
77. ld. at 589.
78. ld.
79. In King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the Utah Court
of Appeals noted that "the controlling precedent from the Utah Supreme Court [Morton] is less
than clear and [has caused a] divergence in recent opinions of this court over how we discern
the appropriate standard of review under UAPA." Id. at 1284. The court further stated, "We
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come in determining whether an agency has been granted discretion, and
thus whether the court's review should be governed by subsection (4)(d)
or subsection (4)(h)(i). Morton's directive that courts seek out grants of
discretion before applying the intermediate standard of review under
subsection (4)(h)(i) has led to two different approaches in the court of
appeals.
The approach taken by most of the judges on the court of appeals is
outlined in King v. Industrial Commission. 80 According to this approach, the court first determines whether the legislature explicitly
granted the agency discretion to interpret or apply the statutory language
at issue. 81 The court will find that the legislature has explicitly granted
the agency discretion if there is specific statutory language directing the
agency to define a statutory term by regulation, or if a statute directs the
agency to interpret or apply specific statutory language. 82 For example,
in Albertsons, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 83 the court
found an explicit grant of discretion in title 35, section 4-59(b)(l) of the
Utah Code, which provides that a claimant is ineligible for unemployment
benefits if the individual is "discharged for just cause ... if so found by
the commission. " 84 When the court finds an explicit grant of discretion
it will review the agency's action under section (4)(h)(i) for abuse of
discretion. 85 That is, the court will afford the agency decision some
deference and assess whether its action is within the bounds of reasonableness.
Second, if the court does not find an explicit grant of discretion, it
examines the language of the statute and the statutory framework for an
implicit grant of discretion. 86 If the statutory language is broad and
expansive or subject to numerous interpretations, the court will assume
that the legislature has chosen to defer to the policy making expertise of
the agency, and it will find an implicit grant of discretion. The court will

spent far Jess time grappling with the standard of review under [pre-UAPA's] relatively simple
analysis. The complexities involved in the new analysis seem not, in the end, to make a
significant enough difference for the amount of energy we expend." Jd. at 1286 n.5.
80. ld. at 1281.
81. ld. at 1291.
82. /d.
83. 854 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
84. /d. at 573 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-4-59(b)(l) (Supp. 1992)) (emphasis
added).
85. See, e.g., Tasters, LTD v. Department of Employment Sec., 819 P.2d 361, 365
(Utalt Ct. App. 1991) (the legislature's use of language such as "unless it is shown to the
satisfaction of the commission," and "considered [by the commission] if applicable" in UTAH
CODE ANN. § 35-4-220)(5) (Supp. 1989) indicates an explicit grant of discretion).
86. King, 850 P.2d at 1291.
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review the action under subsection (4)(h)(i) for abuse of discretion. 87
If, on the other hand, the language is clear and unambiguous and the
court can interpret and apply the statutory language by traditional
methods of statutory construction, the court will review the agency action
under subsection (4)(d) for correction of error. 88
Judge Bench on the court of appeals has articulated a slightly
different approach to the appropriate analysis mandated by Morton. Like
the majority's approach, the first question under his reading is whether
there is an explicit grant of discretion to the agency to interpret or apply
statutory language. 89 If there is an explicit grant of discretion, the court
applies a deferential standard of review. Judge Bench, however, takes a
more narrow view of what the supreme court meant by an "explicit
grant" of discretion to interpret a statutory term. According to Bench,
in order to find an explicit grant, "the legislature must direct or authorize
the agency to define the statutory term by rule. " 90 Judge Bench cites
title 7, section 3-19(4) of the Utah Code, which provides that "[t]he
commissioner may, by rule or regulation, define the terms 'loans and
extensions of credit' and 'person' as used in this section" as an example
of an explicit grant of discretion to interpret a statute. 91
If the court fails to find an explicit grant of discretion, it then
determines whether there is an implicit grant. The first question in this
process is whether the statute is ambiguous. For, as Judge Bench
explains, "[i]f the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no implicit
grant of discretion possible because there is no interpretation required by
the agency. The agency simply applies the statute according to its plain
language. " 92 If the statute is ambiguous, the court should apply
traditional rules of statutory construction to ascertain the meaning of the
statute. No deference is given to the agency's interpretation if the statute
may be interpreted in accordance with traditional rules of construction.
If, however, a traditional analysis of the statute does not resolve the

87. ld.
88. ld.
89. Ferro v. Utah Dep 't of Commerce, Div. of Occupational & Professional Licensing,
828 P.2d 507, 510 and n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing Morton, 814 P.2d at 589).
90. Bhatia v. DepartmentofEmploymentSec., 834 P.2d574, 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
(Bench J., concurring).
91. ld. atn.3. See also UTAH CODE ANN.§ 26-6-3(2)(b)(1994) ("The department shall,
by rule, define persons who shall be considered 'partners' for purposes of this section."); id.
§ 26-21-13.5(3) ("The department may define by rule 'small health care facility' for purposes
oflicensure under this section .... "); id. § 31A-20-107(5)(b) ("The commissioner shall define
'insignificant market share' by rule."); id. § 59-12-104(15)(b) ("[F]or purposes of this
subsection, the commission shall by rule define 'new or expanding operations' and
'establishment.'").
92. Ferro, 828 P.2d at 510.
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ambiguities and "there is no discernible legislative intent concerning [the]
specific issue[,] the Legislature has, in effect, left the issue unresolved.
In such a case, it is appropriate to conclude that the Legislature has
delegated authority to the agency to decide the issue. " 93 Where there
is no discernible legislative intent the court assumes that the legislature
expected the agency to use its expertise in choosing between the possible
permissible interpretations. The choice of interpretations in such cases
is therefore viewed as a policy decision by the agency to which the court
should give deference. 94
A comparison of the two approaches reveals that the majority
approach is articulated in less constrictive terms. For example, the
majority has a broader view of what constitutes an explicit grant of
discretion. Under Judge Bench's view, an explicit grant of discretion is
limited to circumstances where the legislature has directed an agency to
adopt rules interpreting a given term. 95 The majority, on the other
hand, is willing to find an explicit grant of discretion not only in an
adopted rule, but in any language that directs the agency to interpret or
apply specific statutory language. 96 Furthermore, Judge Bench insists
that it is important to distinguish between grants of discretion to interpret
the law, and grants of discretion to apply the law. He has stated that
"[o]ne cannot logically conclude, however, that just because the
legislature grants an agency discretion to apply the law as an adjudicative
tribunal, it also intended that reviewing courts defer to the agency's interpretation of the law applied. " 97 Although the majority recognizes that
grants of discretion to interpret statutory language are different than
grants of discretion to apply statutory language, they object to Judge
Bench's "vigorous effort to build an impenetrable wall between the two
98
•••• "
According to the majority, "[Judge Bench's] analysis is needlessly mechanistic and does not follow the direction of [the Utah]

93. /d. at 511 (quoting Morton, 814 P.2d at 589).
94. /d. at 511.
95. See supra text accompanying note 90.
96. See supra text accompanying note 82. In King, the majority argued that Morton
refutes Judge Bench's view that "an explicit grant of discretion can only be found in language
directing the agency to define a statutory term by rule." King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P.2d
1281, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The majority pointed out that the example of an explicit
grant of discretion in Morton "does not show a specific legislative directive to define a statutory
term by rule as Judge Bench would require." /d.
97. Employers' Reinsurance Fund v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 856 P.2d 648, 650n.3
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).
98. /d. at 655 (Billings, J., concurring).
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supreme court" 99 which did not differentiate between "statutory
construction or application" in the Morton analysis. 100
b. Subsection (4)(h)(ii): Action Contrary to Rule of Agency. Subsection (4)(h)(ii) allows an appellate court to grant judicial relief from
agency action that is "contrary to. a rule of the agency. " 101 In Union
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax
Commission, 102 the Union Pacific Railroad Company sought relief from
a sales and use tax deficiency imposed by the Commission for failure to
pay sales and use tax on ballast and fuel purchased in Utah for use
outside the state. Union Pacific claimed that the Commission's rules on
interstate sales exempted the purchases from sales and use tax.
In determining whether to grant the Commission's decision any
deference, the court stated that "Section 63-4b-16(4)(h)(ii) refers to rules
promulgated by the agency itself. Because courts should uphold agency
rules if they are reasonable and rational, courts should also uphold
reasonable and rational departures from those rules absent a showing that
the departure violated some other right. " 103 The court proceeded to
apply the intermediate standard in reviewing Union Pacific's claim that
the Commission erred in applying its rules.
c. Subsection (4)(h)(iii): Action is Contrary to Agency's Prior
Practice. Subsection (4)(h)(iii) provides that an appellate court shall
grant relief from agency action that is "contrary to the agency's prior
practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and
reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency. " 104 Subsection (4)(h)(iii) explicitly incorporates the intermediate
standard of review, allowing inconsistencies if the agency can "demonstrate a fair and rational basis" for them. Although the supreme court
has not yet reviewed a challenge to agency action brought under
subsection (4)(h)(iii), Justice Durham has noted that the standard of
review incorporated into this subsection shifts the burden of persuasion
from the party challenging agency action to the agency. Justice Durham
stated that subsection (4)(h)(iii) "requires the agency to demonstrate the
reasonableness and rationality of its departure, while in the typical
challenge to agency action, the party challenging the action carries the
burden of demonstrating its impropriety. " 105
99. /d.
100. ld. (citing Morton, 814 P.2d at 589, 592).
101. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) (1994).
102. 842 P.2d 876 (Utah 1992).
103. /d. at 879 (citing Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988)).
104. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) (1994).
105. Semeco Indus. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1174
(Utah 1993) (Durham, J. dissenting).
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d. Subsection (4)(h)(iv): Action is Arbitrary or Caprzczous. Subsection (4)(h)(iv) permits relief for agency action that is
"otherwise arbitrary and capricious. " 106 Courts have used the phrase
"arbitrary and capricious" to describe both intermediate and great
deference review. 101 In her review of UAPA's standards of review,
Justice Durham suggested that subsection (4)(h)(iv) must be read in
connection with the other parts of subsection (4)(h). 108 Having concluded that the other parts of subsection (4)(h) require intermediate review,
she argues that the court should apply the same standard when reviewing
challenges brought under subsection (4)(h)(iv). 109
Table II on the following pages summarizes the standards of review
under UAPA.
IV.

AFFECf OF UAPA ON THE AMOUNT OF DEFERENCE CouiUS
WILL ACCORD AGENCY DETERMINATIONS

A.

Findings of Fact

Under UAPA, an agency's findings of fact are accorded less
deference. Before UAPA, agency findings of fact were granted great
deference and upheld on review if supported by "evidence of any
substance whatever. " 110 Under UAPA, however, agency findings of
fact receive only intermediate deference. 111 This means that in the
context of final administrative agency adjudications, there is no longer
any area where the court will grant an agency's findings great deference.

B.

Issues of General Law

The standard of review for issues of general law remains unchanged
under UAPA. The supreme court has determined that subsections (4)(a)
through (4)(f) involve questions of general law appropriate for correctionof-error review. 112 Under this standard, the court will not accord
agency determinations of general law any deference.

106. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-l6(4)(h)(iv) (1994).
107. See Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 610 (Utah
1983) (intermediate deference); id. at 609 (great deference).
lOS. Semeco, 849 P.2d at 1174.
109. The Utah Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to consider a challenge to
agency action brought under subsection (4)(h)(iv).
110. See supra part II.
lll. See supra part III.E.
112. See supra part III.A.-III.F.
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II: STANDARDS OF REVIEW UNDER UAPA

I

I
Subsection (4)(a):

STANDARD OF

DEGREE OF

REVIEW

DEFERENCE

Correction of error

No deference

Correction of error

No deference

Correction of error

No deference

Correction of error

No deference

Correction of error

No deference

Correction of error

No deference

unconstitutional agency
action
Subsection (4)(b):
agency action beyond
jurisdiction conferred
by statute
Subsection (4)(c):
agency has not decided
all the issues requiring
resolution
Subsection (4)(d):
agency has erroneously
intetpreted or applied
the law
Subsection (4)(e):
agency has engaged in
unlawful procedure
Subsection (4)(t):
illegally constituted
decision-making body

389]

UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT

TABLE

II: STANDARDS OF REVIEW UNDER UAPA

STANDARD OF

DEGREE OF

REVIEW

DEFERENCE

Substantial evidence

Some deference

Subsection (4)(h)(i):

Abuse of discretion

Some deference

agency action is an

(Intermediate standard

I

I

Subsection (4)(g):
findings of fact

abuse of discretion
delegated to the agency

by statute

of review)
Applied only where the
court finds an explicit
or implicit grant of
discretion to interpret
or apply statutory
language.

Subsection (4)(h)(ii):

Intermediate standard

Some deference

Intermediate standard

Some deference

Intermediate standard

Some deference

agency action is contrary to a rule of the
agency
Subsection (4)(h)(iii):
agency action is contrary to the agency's
prior practice
Subsection (4)(h)(iv):
agency action is otherwise arbitrary or capricious

411

412

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

C.

[Volume 9

Issues of Agency Specific Law

An agency's determination of agency specific law used to receive
intermediate deference if the agency's experience and expertise put it in
a better position than the court to decide an issue. 113 Under UAPA,
agency determinations of agency specific law will be granted deference
only if the court finds that the legislature has granted the agency
discretion to interpret or apply the statutory language at issue. 114 This
seems to be a dramatic change from pre-UAPA law that will limit the
scope of agency action entitled to intermediate deference. In Morton,
however, the court suggested that this change may not have a significant
effect on the standard used to review agencies' statutory interpretations
and applications of their own statutes because "[i]n many cases where
[the court] would summarily grant an agency deference on the basis of
its expertise, it is also appropriate to grant the agency deference on the
basis of an explicit or implicit grant of discretion contained in the
governing statute. " 115
The court of appeals has interpreted this passage from Morton to
mean that "consideration of an agency's expertise and experience is [still]
relevant in determining whether the agency should make the necessary
policy choice and thus be granted deference by the reviewing court. " 116
As support for this conclusion, the court of appeals cited Sanders Brine
Shrimp v. Audit Division of the Utah State Tax Commission 111 and
Board of Equalization v. Utah State Tax Commission. 118 In both of
these cases, the supreme court cited Chris & Dick's Lumber & Hardware
v. Tax Commission119 for the proposition that "we give no deference to
an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute absent certain
circumstances, none of which exist here. " 120 The "certain circumstances" referred to in Chris & Dick's are those instances where courts
should defer to the agency's experience and expertise. 121
Thus, whether the change made by UAPA to the standard of review
for agency specific law will decrease the amount of deference courts
accord agencies remains to be seen. As additional cases involving

113.
114.
115.
1991).
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See supra part II.
See supra part III.G.l.
Morton Int'1 v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah
King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1287 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
846 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1993).
846 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1993).
791 P.2d 511 (Utah 1990).
Sanders, 846 P.2d at 1305; Board of Equalization, 846 P.2d at 1295.
Chris & Dick's, 791 P.2d at 513-14.
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interpretation and application of agency-specific law emerge, we will see
whether there are any cases in which the court would have granted the
agency deference because of its expertise and experience under preUAPA law, but does not do so under UAPA because it fails to find a
grant of discretion. If such cases exist, then UAPA has decreased the
amount of deference accorded to agencies. On the other hand, if, as the
court of appeals suggests, courts continue to consider agency experience
and expertise in deciding whether to grant an agency deference, then
UAPA has not significantly affected the amount of deference accorded
agency determinations of agency specific law.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the Utah Administrative Procedures Act was a necessary
step forward in administrative law in Utah, its implementation has altered
the standards used to review final agency action in formal adjudicative
proceedings. Specifically, UAPA replaced the court's standard for
reviewing findings of fact and altered the way in which appellate courts
determine the scope of agency action entitled to intermediate deference.
The overall effect will be a decrease in the amount of deference courts
accord agency action.
John C. Steele

